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INTRODUCTION
Mutual funds have huge financial resources, more than a half-
trillion dollars of assets in the aggregate.' Only three types of
financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, and pension
plans) have greater aggregate assets. Yet despite their size, mutual
funds rarely participate in corporate governance. They are interme-
diaries, channeling funds from disparate individuals into invest-
ments. They gather and process information about industrial in-
vestments that the funds' owners cannot easily gather and process.
t Professor, Columbia Law School. Bernie Black, Marvin Chirelstein, Tamar
Frankel, Bart Friedman, Helen Garten, Jeffrey Gordon, Lou Lowenstein, David
Ratner, and Ed Rock made helpful suggestions on an earlier draft. Cory Joyce
provided research assistance. The Bradley Foundation and Columbia's Center for the
Study of the Institutional Investor supported the research.
1 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS AcCOUNTS:
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND LIABILrrIES YEAR-END, 1966-1989, at 30 (Sept. 1990).
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They do the paperwork that individuals begrudge. They provide
diversification, which is what many investors want. Yet they are not
intermediaries that invest in concentrated holdings and that enter
the corporate boardroom to represent their shareholder beneficia-
ries, which is what some investors might want. Voices are heard
complaining that institutional investors do not become actively
involved in monitoring, or supporting, the managements of their
portfolio companies. Yet mutual funds usually stay far from the
scene of corporate governance; only rarely can they be found inside
the corporate boardroom.
In the 1930s some mutual funds began to act as monitoring
intermediaries. They underwrote securities, became active players
in bankruptcy reorganizations, and participated in management.
2
The Revenue Act of 1936, followed up by the Investment Company
Act of 1940, forced the funds to stop. Why?
Odder still is the timing of the cut-off of mutual funds from
corporate governance. In the early 1930s Berle and Means
publicized their finding that with the atomization of shareholdings,
power was shifting from shareholders to managers in the large
public company.3 Mutual funds could concentrate shareholders'
power. The manager of a mutual fund could have been a conduit
of shareholder power. The mutual fund would have the potential
power and motivation to check the activities of management. But
within a few years, tax rules and the 1940 Act raised the cost of (or
outright prohibited) close mutual fund involvement with their
portfolio companies.
The prohibitions and restrictions were not oversights, nor were
their consequences unintended. Key players in the Administration
and Congress wanted to prevent mutual fund (and other banker)
control of industrial companies. Explanations for severance can be
seen in (a) popular opinion mistrustful of large financial institu-
tions, (b) public-spirited rules intended to foster stable mutual funds
for the average investor, (c) the accidents of tax doctrine, and (d) a
glimmer of an interest group story of some political actors favoring
local managers over Wall Street.
2 See SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES pt. 4, at 370-71 (1942)
[hereinafter SEC INVESTMENT COMPANY STUDY]; Investment Dilemma-Trusts Forced to
Choose Between Drastic Reorganization and High Tax, Under New Law, Bus. WK.,July 11,
1936, at 45, 46.
3 See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, TIE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
153-88 (1932).
1991] POLITICS OF CREATING A MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY 1471
Opinion polls show the popular mind has mistrusted large
financial institutions with accumulated power and has always been
wary of Wall Street controlling industrial America. Politicians
responded to this mistrust by enacting rules restricting the power
of private financial institutions. During the SEC's formative years,
its chairman said:
[T]he banker [should and will be] restricted to ... underwriting
or selling. Insofar as management [and] formulation of industrial
policies ... the banker will be superseded. The financial power
which he has exercised in the past over such processes will pass
into other hands.
4
A pattern can be seen in the history of American corporate
finance. 5 Institutions that can influence industry are restrained
from growing too big. If they do grow anyway, their portfolios are
forcibly fragmented. If the fragmented institutions attempt to link
themselves together to control industry, law prohibits those links.
For banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds,
the story is the same. Either separately or collectively, they have,
perhaps wisely, been stymied from controlling or influencing
industry after they have made their investments. What's more,
there is a pattern of politics behind these prohibitions. In this
article, I examine one of these financial institutions, the mutual
fund.
I. THE 1940 ACT RESTRICTIONS
Mutual funds pool the investment funds of hundreds of
investors, thereby enabling the investors both to diversify and to buy
the investment expertise of the fund's managers. Even when the
1940 Act was passed, cognoscenti recognized that the mutual fund
offered a third function, beyond diversification and expert manage-
ment: "[the investor] may be able to join in the purchase of control
of one or more other corporations."6 Investment companies could
4 W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 40-41 (1940) (quoting from a speech
Douglas gave in 1937 to a stunned audience that included nearly every important
Wall Street investment banker).
5 See Roe, A Political Theory offAmerican Corporate Finance, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 10,
32-36 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, A Political Theory]; Roe, Political and Legal Restraints
on Ownership and Control of Public Companies, 27J. FIN. ECON. 7 (1990).
6 Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303, 305 (1941).
Jaretzki represented a group of investment companies at congressional hearings on
the 1940 Act.
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take large blocks of stock, making monitoring worthwhile. In theory
they could have evolved into the missing monitoring link between
fragmented investors and large operating firms.
A. Power of Control
Congress was suspicious of mutual funds with the power to
control industrial companies. A 1934 Senate securities report
identified two functions for mutual funds: investment and control
of management. 7 The report asserted the control function was
improper for mutual funds. The funds should only passively invest.
Holding companies rather than mutual funds were organized for
control. And this control was denigrated: the holding company
structure was indicted with conflicts of interest that damaged
outside shareholders. Holding companies were generally under
attack. Public utilities were commonly organized in holding com-
panies until the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 forced
their end. That same act. directed the SEC to draft legislation
dealing with control blocks in mutual funds. And hostility to
holding companies can be seen in the 1930's judicial opinions such
as Consolidated Rock and Deep Rock.8
Only unscrupulous financiers mixed investment with control:
"The investment company [has] bec[o]me the instrumentality of
financiers and industrialist-; to facilitate acquisition of concentrated
control of the wealth and industries of the country."9 As a conse-
quence, Congress must "prevent the diversion of these [investment]
trusts from their normal channels of diversified investment to the
abnormal avenues of control of industry."10 Congress might have
"to completely divorce investment trusts from investment bank-
ing."1 1 The SEC was later directed to draft legislation.
7 See STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES: REPORT OF THE COMM. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 333-34 (1934) [hereinafter PECORA
REPORT, in reference to its final chief counsel].
8 In Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941), the Supreme
Court refused to respect a holding company, substantively consolidating the assets
and liabilities of the parent and subsidiary. In Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co.
(Deep Rock), 306 U.S. 307 (1939), the Supreme Court subordinated the debt due
from a subsidiary to its parent company. (To be sure, the misdeeds of the parent
company probably justified the results in both instances.)
9 PECORA REPORT, supra note 7, at 333.
10 Id. at 393 (emphasis added). See also Investment Trusts and Investment Companies:
Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 36 (1940) [hereinafter 1940 Act Hearings] (quoting the
PECORA REPORT, supra note 7).
11 Id.; cf. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 3, at 183-85 (objecting to unscrupulous
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The SEC declared in its proposed bill that "the national public
interest... [is] adversely affected... when investment companies
[have] great size... [and] have excessive influence on the national
economy." 12 In 1935, 65 investment companies had controlling
interests in 187 portfolio companies.13 Little good could come out
of investment company control over portfolio companies, the SEC
believed. 14 Big blocks could leave the fund undiversified; due to
the lack of diversification the investment company might have heavy
losses. The investment company might pump money into the
portfolio company to protect a large position, unwisely change the
portfolio company's financial policy or capital structure, force
dividends out from the portfolio company at too high a rate, or
force a merger on terms disadvantageous to the outside sharehold-
ers of the controlled company.
15
The SEC conceded that mutual funds had the expertise,
motivation and financial muscle to ameliorate the informational and
organizational problems of scattered shareholders. "These invest-
ment companies can perform the function of sophisticated
investors, disassociated from the management of their portfolio
companies. They can appraise the activities of the management
critically and expertly and in that manner not only serve their own
interest but also the interest of the other public stockholders."
16
Nevertheless, the disadvantages of investment companies with the
power to control outweighed the advantages. The SEC wanted
mutual fund directors and employees off the boards of all portfolio
companies; they wanted a Glass-Steagall-type severance. 17  They
also wanted to bar any fund from exceeding $150 million in
holding companies).
12 1940 Act Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 2, at 434. This statement of purpose also
showed concern for efficient investment management and protection of investors.
Is See SEC INVESTMENT COMPANY STUDY, supra note 2, at 8; WHARTON SCHOOL
OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE SEC, H.R. REP. No. 2274,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 399 (1962) [hereinafter WHARTON INVESTMENT COMPANY
STUDY].
14 See SEC INVESTMENT COMPANY STUDY, supra note 2, at 22.
15 See id.; WHARTON INVESTMENT COMPANY STUDY, supra note 13, at 400.
16 SEC INVESTMENT COMPANY STUDY, supra note 2, at 371; WHARTON INVESTMENT
COMPANY STUDY, supra note 13, at 400 n.9.
17 See 1940 Act Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 1, at 216-20. The Glass-Steagall Act
severed most commercial and investment banking functions. In recent years, its
scope has been limited and the Administration recently proposed abolishing most of
it. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991), reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) Report Letter No. 1377, pt. 2, at 53-59 (Feb. 14, 1991).
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assets.18 Eventually the SEC had to compromise with the mutual
fund industry, but they still achieved a great deal of severance.
B. Diversification
First, under the Investment Company Act of 1940, a mutual
fund cannot advertise itself as "diversified" if it owns in the
regulated part of its portfolio more than 10% of the voting stock of
any company.19 Three-quarters of the portfolio is subject to this
fragmentation rule, even f that influential block of stock is only a
small portion of the fund's entire portfolio. The SEC wanted that
restriction to disable mutual fund control of portfolio compa-
nies.2 0 Some mutual funds might have competed as monitors by
owning large blocks of stock. That prospect was cut-off for
diversified investment companies. Today, virtually all mutual funds
call themselves diversified: they do not control public firms.
Not registering under the 1940 Act won't help the fund to avoid
the prohibition on control: any public company holding itself out
as investing in securities is an "investment company" under the Act.
No unregistered investment company shall "control any company
[engaged in] interstate commerce." 2 1 (If the company is through
majority-owned subsidiaries primarily in the business of its subsidiar-
ies, then it can be exempt from the 1940 Act.22)
Several states have had even more severe restrictions: to sell
mutual fund shares to their residents, the fund cannot own more
than 10% of any portfolio company.23 Many mutual funds have
adopted an investment policy of not permitting themselves to use
even the limited portfolio concentration that the 1940 Act contem-
18 See 1940AtHearings, supra note 10, pt. 1, at 188 (statement of David Schenker,
Chief Counsel SEC Investment Trust Study), pt. 2, at 375, 400-01, 412. The SEC also
refused requests that it recommend that the IRS allow mutual funds with control
blocks to have untaxed, pass-through status.
19 See Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act) § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
5(b)(1) (1988).
20 See 1940 Act Hearings, suira note 10, pt. 1, at 188 (statement of David
Schenker); T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS, § 33.1, at 343 (1978).
21 1940 Act §§ 3(a)(1), 7(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(a)(1), 80a-7(a)(5) (1988).
2 See id. § 3(b)(1), (c)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(1), (c)(6); T. FRANKEL, supra note
20, at 378-80.
25 See WHARTON INVESTMENT COMPANY REPORT, supra note 13, at 403 (noting
Ohio, California and a few others); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1301:6-3-09(G)(1)(h) (1977)
(prohibiting management-type investment companies from selling shares in Ohio if
any part of the portfolio has more than 10% of the voting stock of a company).
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plates. State rules and the tax limitations discussed in the next
section help explain why.
The 1940 Act requires that mutual funds calling themselves
diversified have no more than 5% of the mutual fund's regulated
assets in the securities of any one issuer. 24 As a diversification
standard, this provision is crude. But in the context of the 1930s
understanding of finance it seems superficially defensible. Mutual
funds are often designed for unsophisticated investors who cannot
assemble a diversified portfolio or evaluate the mutual fund's
portfolio. 25 By requiring some standard of fragmentation if the
fund chooses to call itself diversfied, the 1940 Act helps make sure
investors get what they were promised.
But this crude standard only justifies the 5% restriction (the
mutual fund may not invest more than 5% of its regulated assets in
any single company). The 10% restriction (the mutual fund may not
buy more than 10% of a portfolio company's voting stock) is
unnecessary for true diversification. Obviously, an investment
company could have a small portion of its assets in a single firm, but
if the firm were medium-sized the investment company could have
an influential block of stock. Thus, the not-so-hidden goal was to
disable control, not to promote diversification.
To be sure, the rule has disclosure benefits. And even a modern
definition of diversification would require some fragmentation. A
modern notion of diversification would not use the 10% restriction,
which prohibits purchase of more than 10% of any portfolio
company's stock. But the result might be close to the same. Only
mutual funds much larger than any that now exist would be able to
diversify, and take greater 10%+ blocks of the largest American
public companies.
And the 10% restriction might instead be justified as a liquidity
rule. Open-ended mutual funds must be prepared to redeem their
stock. Heavy redemption would require the fund to sell portfolio
stock, and a portfolio full of 10%+ holdings might be illiquid, if only
because of 16(b) restrictions.
26
24 See 1940 Act § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (1988).
2 See 86 CONG. REc. app. at 1478 (1940) (remarks of Sen. Wagner); PECORA
REPORT,supra note 7, at 348-51 (criticizing mutual fund that put 19% of its assets into
a railroad's stock).
26 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1988). Under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, profits from stock bought and sold
within six months must be disgorged, irrespective of whether inside information
motivated the purchase or sale.
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Although the 1940 Act definition prevents a large diversified
fund from taking large chunks of portfolio companies' stock, the
rule is only a nuisance, not a show-stopper: the fund could decline
to call itself diversified and this part of 1940 Act wouldn't bite. But
as shall be seen, the large block would trigger other 1940 Act
nuisances; the 1940 Act, and other rules, make it difficult to
network medium-sized blocks held by several different financial
institutions, and tax rules that roughly track the diversification
definition would still apply, and be more than a nuisance.
C. Networks and Affiliates
The 1940 Act exempts a quarter of the portfolio from the
fragmentation rules. And, the fund could choose theoretically not
to call itself diversified in order to avoid regulation under the
fragmentation rules. (I say "theoretically" because, as the next
section shows, tax penalty rules track the 1940 Act's diversification
rules.)
But for that limited portion of the portfolio that may be
concentrated, other restrictions apply. True, the 1940 Act does not
explicitly prohibit a mutual fund or its employees from sitting on
the board of a portfolio company, as the SEC sought. But if the
mutual fund owned 5% of a portfolio company's stock and net-
worked with a group of institutions owning 5% of the stock of the
portfolio company, all would become 1940 Act affiliates. The 1940
Act prohibits the mutual fund lacking an SEC exemption from
acting jointly with an affiliated financial institution to join a
portfolio company's board of directors, or otherwise jointly assert
influence.
27
Less significantly, if the block of stock were big enough so that
the network's representative sat on the portfolio company's board
and sufficiently influenced decisions so that it had a "controlling
influence" that was attributed to the mutual fund, then transactions
between any other member of the network and the portfolio
company would be prohibited without SEC exemption.
28
27 See 1940 Act § 17(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d); see also SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc.,
399 F.2d 396,404-05 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969) (sustaining the
SEC's requirement for advance approval of parallel purchases by mutual fund and
affiliate seeking control). The SEC may grant exemptions.
28 See 1940 Act §§ 2(a)(2)-(3), 17(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(2)-(3), 80a-17(a)-(b)
(1988); see also 17 C.F.R. § 2 7 0.17a-6 (1990) (codifying exemptions to restrictions on
affiliated persons).
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Each mutual fund in a constellation of separate mutual funds
with a common advisor might take 4.9% of the portfolio company's
stock. The common advisor to the funds could then wield a large
block of stock. But I understand that while some mutual fund
complexes have multiple holdings in several different mutual funds,
they usually avoid having the aggregate ownership of the complex
reach 10%, perhaps because of fear of entering legal gray areas.
29
The 1940 Act prohibits cross-ownership. No investment
company may buy any voting stock of a corporation if each would
own more than 3% of the voting stock of the other."0 A portfolio
company unhappy with the prospect of a mutual fund exerting
control could force the mutual fund out by preemptively buying 3%
of the fund's stock. 1 In effect, mutual funds need the consent of
portfolio firm management before the mutual fund can enter the
boardroom.
Moreover, if the mutual fund wished to act jointly with an
affiliate to exercise control, it would need prior SEC approval.
3 2
We can imagine an incipient network of institutional investors: An
investment bank, an insurance company, or a commercial bank
might become the investment adviser to a mutual fund. The adviser
might take the 4.9% of the stock that the mutual fund holds, and
combine that with a similar-sized holding of the investment bank,
affiliated mutual funds, the insurance company, the commercial
bank's trust department, or the bank's holding company. That
combined block might be large enough to be influential, getting a
2 The common block might be attributed to the advisor and lead to affiliate
status with the portfolio company anyway. By violating the spirit of the 1940 Act's
10% rule, the advisor might fear regulatory hostility, even if there were no regulatory
action. The group might be aggregated for purposes of Section 16(b) of the 1934
Act, which requires a return of six month trading profits for 10%+ owners.
30 See H. BULLOCK, THE STORY OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES 90 (1959); 1940 Act
§ 20(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(c) (1988).
S' I understand that at least one target firm has neutralized mutual fund
ownership in a hostile takeover through the cross-ownership prohibition.
32 See 1940 Act § 17(a)(1)-(2), (b); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a)(1)-(2), (b) (1988); 17
C.F.R. § 270.17d-1(a) (1990); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783,834 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), aff'-d 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983) (holding
the joint action need not have any influence on the affiliate's conduct, as "[t]he Act
is designed to proscribe the appearance of or conflicts of interest"). There are some
exceptions, but not when the investment company commits more than 5% of its assets
to thejoint enterprise, puts a director on the board of the affiliate, or the investment
advisor to the mutual fund or any other affiliate has its own money also at risk, such
as when it buys stock in the portfolio company. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1(d)(5) (1990).
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representative into the boardroom. But this consortium would have
to obtain SEC approval of its activities, control actions, and plan.
If the joint participants only wanted to campaign to get a director
elected, then it would be hard to see why the SEC would deny the
request. The approval would be a cost, but not a show-stopper. But
if a participant expected to do business with the portfolio company,
by lending, for example, then one should expect-for good reason,
perhaps-SEC hostility. In the absence of a blanket SEC authoriza-
tion, the need for SEC approval is one more burden on institutions
that seek influence in the boardroom. The 1940 Act rules discour-
age financial networks.
II. ORIGINS IN THE 1936 REVENUE ACT
A. Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code
If a mutual fund were to deploy most of its portfolio in large
influential blocks, it would be taxed unfavorably on its entire
portfolio, because the Tax Code allows only diversified mutual funds
to pass income through, untaxed to the conduit mutual fund. The
1936 Revenue Act's notion of diversification, like the 1940 Act's
notion, is not that found in. modern textbooks on corporate finance;
mutual funds have to have their investments in companies constitut-
ing no more than 5% of the portfolio and constituting no more than
10% of the portfolio company's outstanding stock.33 Later, in 1942,
the Tax Code was amended to allow half of the portfolio to be more
concentrated; for that other half, no more than 25% of the fund's
assets can go into a single company's stock. 4
Witnesses at the 1940 Act hearings suggested that the principal
basis for the distinction between diversified and nondiversified
companies was not tax policy, but regulatory policy. The distinction
was to establish "good" mutual funds-those that did not exert
33 See Revenue Act of 1936 § 48(e)(2)(A)-(B), Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648,
1669 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 361(b)(1)-(2) (1939) (amended 1942)).
34 See Revenue Act of 1942 § 170, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798, 878-879
(codified at I.R.C. § 851(b)(4) (1988)). Venture capital firms, which could monitor
small firms, not the large firms that are our subject, are partially exempt from the no-
control provision. See I.R.C. § 851(e) (1988).
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control-which would be favorably taxed, and all other mutual funds,
which would be unfavorably taxed.3 5
If a mutual fund's income were taxed at the ordinary corporate
tax rate, that is, if the fund could not get pass-through status, the
fund would be decimated by a triple taxation of income. Income
received as dividends would be taxed twice: once when earned by
the portfolio company, and then again when received by the mutual
fund. The mutual fund could exclude most of the dividends
received, netting out to an effective tax rate of 10% on dividends.
Capital gains would be taxed at 34%. The income would then be
taxed again at ordinary rates when paid to shareholders of a
nondiversified fund. 6 The tax on intercorporate dividends has a
history parallel to mutual fund regulation and taxation. Until 1935,
intercorporate dividends were not taxed. Then the New Deal
Congress taxed dividends to discourage complex corporate
structures.
3 7
The tax result would also deter most ordinary corporations from
taking large long-term ownership blocks. A corporation might
accept the unfavorable tax status in the short-run, as a prelude to a
takeover and restructuring. But the corporation asserting control
over the long-term would have to be confident that it had unusually
acute monitoring skills. After all, if the monitor received half of its
income in capital gains and half in dividends, then it would have to
pay approximately 20% of its income in taxes. A great deal of
effective monitoring would be needed to make up for that initial
35 See 1940 Act Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 2, at 435-36 (statement of Raymond
McGrath, Executive Vice-President, General American Investors, arguing against the
SEC's regulatory view).
36 See I.R.C. §§ 243, 852(a)-(b) (1988). Here is the calculation, based on today's
rates for a non-subchapter M corporation. The fund's tax rate is 34%. Seventy
percent of its dividends received from portfolio companies are excludable. These
dividends face an effective tax rate of 10.2% (.3 x .34 = .102). If the fund owned
more than 20% of the stock of some portfolio companies, the dividends from those
companies would have an exclusion rate of 80%. These dividends would face an
effective tax rate of 6.8% (.2 x .34 = .068). Capital gains would now be taxed at a rate
of 34%. Since capital gains can be deferred by postponing the sales, the effective rate
is less than 34%.37 See B. BrrrKER &J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS § 5.06, at 5-22 n.61 (5th ed. 1987).
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penalty. Nor could the company organize itself as a public
partnership, which would be able to pass its income through to
owners without itself paying tax. To get such pass-through tax
status, a publicly-traded partnership must comply with subchapter
M's portfolio restrictions.
3 8
So, if a mutual fund wished to sell services as an intermediary/
monitor, by dividing its portfolio into three or four stocks, it could
not get the advantage of subchapter M. And no mutual fund could
ever threaten a portfolio company that it would devote more than a
quarter of its assets to obtaining a majority of the portfolio
company's stock in order to oust management. That threat, and the
influence it would yield, is always prohibited for a subchapter M
mutual fund.3 9
The costs of operating a control-fund are cumulative. First
come the tax costs: dividends would be taxed at rates between 6.8%
and 10.2%; capital gains would be taxed at the ordinary rate. Then
come the other costs of taking large blocks: section 16(b) of the
1934 Act would force disgorgement of all short-swing trading profits
made when the fund owned 10%+ of a portfolio company, regard-
less of whether the trading was done on inside information.40 The
costs of the fund networking with other financial institutions would
not be trivial. (Section 13(d) requires the network to register with
the SEC. The fund cannot affiliate with a commercial bank or its
trust department.41) And foregoing the tax advantages of sub-
chapter M would not relieve the fund of the costs of the 1940 Act:
the fund would still have to register as an investment company
under the 1940 Act and comply with the Act's terms.
These laws do not prohibit all large blocks in mutual funds. But
they do constrain the supply of blocks, and raise the cost of
networking with others to send a representative into the board-
rooms of the largest public companies.
38 The key tax provisions are at I.R.C. §§ 243, 1201 & 7704(c) (1988). Private
partnerships surely can get pass-through tax status; such private control funds are
now forming.
39 See I.R.C. § 851(b)(4)(B) (1988). Nor can mutual funds issue senior securities
to enhance absolute size, and hence the size of the chunk that goes into any single
company. See 1940 Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a) (1988).
40 See 1934 Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). The tone of my comments is
that taxing control funds is not wise. But I am not arguing that the other restric-
tions-such as the return of short-swing trading profits-are also necessarily unwise.
Insider trading is not to be applauded. And overbreadth might be necessary to
reduce insider trading, which is difficult to detect.
41 See 1934 Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
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B. Tax Doctrine: Are Mutual Funds Taxable as Corporations?
1. Investment Trusts: Carrying on a Business?
A persistent difficulty in corporate taxation is determining which
entities are taxable as "corporations." The term, said the Revenue
Act of 1926, includes "associations, joint-stock companies and
insurance companies." 42 Trusts and mutual funds were threatened
as associations, which would be taxable as corporations, instead of
as pass-through, untaxed entities.
Case law and regulation made several distinctions, one of which
is quite relevant for our purposes. A trust would not be separately
taxed as a corporation if it was not carrying on a business (and met
several other requirements).43 This result was later codified:
"Associations ... include.., common law trusts ... which act or
do business in an organized capacity.
" 44
Whe[n] trustees merely hold property for the collection of the
income and its distribution among the beneficiaries of a trust, and
are not engaged ... in the carrying on of any business ... no
association exists .... Even in the absence of any control by the
beneficiaries, when the trustees are not restricted to the mere
collection of funds and their payment to the beneficiaries, but are
associated together with similar or greater powers than the
directors of a corporation for the purpose of carrying on some
business enterprise, the trust is an association within the meaning
of the statute.
45
Thus, the problem was that if the trust carried on a business-say
by controlling an operating company and affecting its policies-then
it was carrying on a business of managing companies. Trusts took
the position that when only assembling a passive portfolio of
42 Revenue Act of 1926 § 2(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 9, 9 (codified at
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1988)).
43 See Treas. Reg. 69 art. 1504, quoted in L. WALLSTEIN, SOME LEGAL QUESTIONS
IN RELATION TO INVESTMENT TRUSTS 11 (1928); see also Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144,
160-61 (1924) (reasoning that "the trustees were, in substance, merely holding
property for the collection of the income and its distribution among the beneficiaries,
and were not engaged, either by themselves or in connection with the beneficiaries,
in the carrying on of any business").
44 Treas. Reg. 69 art. 1502, quoted in L. WALLSTEIN, supra note 43, at 11 (emphasis
omitted).
45 Treas. Reg. 69 art. 1504, quoted in L. WALISTEIN, supra note 43, at 11 (emphasis
omitted). See generally Note, Taxation-Taxability of Business Trust as "Association"
within Meaning of Income Tax Act 84 U. PA. L. REV. 666, 667-68 (1935) (discussing
tests for resolving whether a trust is an association).
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diversified stocks and doing no more, the trust never became an
association under the Tax Code.
2. Morrissey v. Commissioner
46
The IRS then took the doctrinally unsurprising position that the
business of providing diversified investments was itself a busi-
ness.47 From this perspective, all trusts and mutual funds should
be taxable at corporate rates. Eventually, in 1935, the Supreme
Court agreed. 48 Investment trusts and mutual funds were orga-
nized to make a profit. Therefore they were associations under the
Tax Code. Consequently, they would be taxed as corporations.
The cumulative effect of these decisions was to insulate only the
unit investment trust from corporate taxation.49 The unit invest-
ment trust puts together a portfolio of securities, sells subdivided
interests in the portfolio, collects the earnings, and returns them to
the beneficiaries. It does not ordinarily buy or sell securities for the
trust.
These passivity doctrines persist in today's subchapter M.
Fragmentation induces passivity, but fragmentation is not the only
passivity-inducing element of subchapter M. Pass-through status
under subchapter M is available only to companies that derive 90%
of their income from investment in stocks, bonds and other
securities. 50 On the face of the statute, there is a serious question
whether a company that intended to make a significant portion of
its income from management, as opposed to passive investment,
would be entitled to subchapter M pass-through at all.
3. Liberalization in the 1936 Code
Against this background, the 1936 Tax Code should be seen as
a "liberalizing" tax law for the mutual fund industry. The 1936 Tax
Act exempted from corporate taxation those mutual funds which
had fragmented portfolios. Yes, for tax purposes such funds were
46 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
47 See Gen. Couns. Mem. 1881 (1928), quoted in L. WALISTEIN, supra note 43, at
19-22.
48 See Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 369. The tax status of the investment company
receiving most of its income as dividends was not much of an issue until intercorpo-
rate dividends were taxed in 1935. See B. BirTKER &J. EUSTICE, supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
49 See L. WALlSTEIN, supra note 43, at 23.
50 See I.R.C. § 851(b)(2) (1988).
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carrying on a business; but it wasn't a "real" business. It was the
business of picking stocks and bonds, not of sitting in boardrooms
and influencing operating decisions. As the president of a leading
mutual fund then said: "[The Tax Code] now recognize[s us] as
being, for purposes of taxation, not a productive agency which should
shoulder a heavier tax burden, but merely a managing agency to
collect dividends and gains for distribution to its shareholders.
51
Tax relief for mutual funds had a fairness-based justification.
The wealthy could get the benefits of professional management by
hiring their own trustee to manage their portfolio. The middle-class
could only get this professional help through a mutual fund. But
after Morrissey made mutual funds taxable in 1935, and intercorpo-
rate dividends became taxable under the 1935 Tax Act, getting that
professional help was inordinately expensive.52 Tax doctrine was
reconciled with the goal of giving the middle-class collective access
to professional investment management by returning to the view
that picking a fragmented portfolio was not really a business after
all.
The debate behind the 1936 Code shows the proponents of the
final measure saying that "another safeguard that the amendment
contains ... is to prevent an investment trust or investment
corporation being set up to obtain control of some corporation and
to manipulate its affairs."53 The safeguard could be against the
"evil" of Wall Street control of industry or the deterioration of tax
doctrine in not allowing the investment trust to carry on a true
business. Later testimony in the committee suggests that the evil of
Wall Street control of large pots of money that could influence
industry was at least part of the evil to ward off.M I suspect that
similar sentiments are powerful today.
55
51 Investment Trust Hails New Tax Act N.Y. Times, July 23, 1936, at 31, col. 1
(emphasis added).
52 See Revenue Act of 1936: Confidential Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the Senate
Comm. on Financz, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 10, at 60-62 (1936) [hereinafter 1936
Revenue Act Hearings] (comments of Mr. Kent, Acting Chief Counsel to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue); id. pt. 11, at 10-11 (comments of Mr. Kent and Sen. Walsh).
53 Id. pt. 11, at 11 (comments of Mr. Kent).
54 See id. at 36-37 (comments of Sen. LaFollette).
55 See, e.g., Bartlett, Books on Greed Wony Wall St., N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1990, at
D1, col. 3 (listing books that indict the Wall Street community).
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III. THE PoLrrIcAL ROOTS OF DISARMING MuTuAL FUNDS
American public opinion has always been mistrustful of
accumulations of economic power;5 6 mechanisms such as mutual
funds that would control industry are unpopular. In the 1930s, FDR
thought that political stability was itself dependent on a dispersal of
economic power. The key political players saw little good coming
from banker influence in industry. Whether the issue was the
chartering of the Bank of the United States, or interstate banking,
or mutual fund control of industry, American politics has usually
opted for fragmentation of financial power.
A standard move in public choice analysis is to find an interest
group that has "bought" the legislation at the expense of a diffuse
and disorganized citizenry. In the financial regulation of banks and
takeovers, legal commentators have seen strong elements of this
interest group approach.5 7 But I believe this approach is less
useful in understanding the 1940 Act. Mutual funds just were not
financially important enough in the 1930s to evoke much interest
group intervention. Rather, politicians were operating at the
symbolic level. They were creating a mutual fund industry. Through
regulation and taxation, politicians created a framework for mutual
funds based on their concept of what a legitimate mutual fund
ought to be. Thereafter, mutual funds had to grow up within that
framework.
A. Anti-Wall Street Sentiment
1. The Pecora Hearings and the Populists:
Father Coughlin and Huey Long
The Pecora hearings reflected and helped form a public opinion
that mistrusted banking and securities practices on Wall Street.
Wall Street bankers were defensive. The second J.P. Morgan said:
"I consider the private banker a national asset and not a national
danger. [Despite accusations to the contrary, the Wall Street banker
has not] become too powerful ... "58 Ferdinand Pecora, counsel
56 See S. LIPSET & W. SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BUsINESS, LABOR, AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MINI) 5-6 (rev. ed. 1987).
5
7 See Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 120
(1987); Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and theJudicial Function: The Dilemma
of Glass-Steagall 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 1 (1984).
58 Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1934) [hereinafter Pecora Hearings] (emphasis added).
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to the Senate Banking Committee for the hearings, later reflected
the national mood: "[T]he terrific concentration of power in
[bankers'] hands from many sources [was] threatening .... The
bankers were neither [just] a national asset nor [just] a national
danger-the were both."5 9 Investment bankers' control over indus-
trial companies was denounced, 60 because representation of
banking interests on the boards of industrial companies perniciously
magnified banker power. Popular opinion was virulently anti-
banker and anti-Wall Street.
61
Anti-banker leaders, such as Huey Long and Father Coughlin,
emerged first on the periphery of national politics. But historians
say that as their prominence grew they influenced developments in
the 1930s due to Roosevelt's desire to coopt them and elements of
their program. What explains the sudden rise to national promi-
nence of Huey Long and Father Coughlin? In a recent history, Alan
Brinkley concludes that while the two men had their repulsive,
demagogic side, they also tapped deep-seated sensible sentiments of
popular protest against distant financial institutions:
The most troubling feature of modern industrial society, Long
and Coughlin maintained, was the steady erosion of the indivi-
dual's ability to control his own destiny. Large, faceless institu-
tions; wealthy, insulated men; vast networks of national and
international influence: all were exercising power and controlling
wealth that more properly belongs in the hands of ordinary
citizens. These same forces had created the economic crisis of the
1930s and threatened, if left unchecked, to perpetuate it....
Power, they argued, should not reside in distant obscure places;
the individual should not have to live in a world in which he could
not govern or even know the forces determining his destiny.
Instead, the nation should aspire to a set of political and economic
arrangements in which authority rested securely in the community,
where it could be observed and, in some measure, controlled by
9 Id. at 6 (emphasis added); see also R. CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 355-74
(1990) (discussing the Pecora Hearings, supra note 58).
60 Voting trusts, for example, were denounced because they were used "to
dominate the management if [the trustees] thought it necessary." Pecora Hearings,
supra note 58, at 3836 (testimony of Harley Clarke, Chase Securities Corp); see also
F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH-THE STORY OF OUR MODERN MONEY
CHANGERS 59, 208 (1939) (describing non-voting stock as "inventions of the devil").
Neither the bankers nor their interrogator discussed whether the alternative to
banker control really was shareholder control-unlikely as Berle and Means were then
demonstrating-or was instead managerial control.
61 See A. BRINKLEY, VOICES OF PROTEST: HUEY LONG, FATHER COUGHLIN, AND
THE GREAT DEPRESSION 148-53 (1982).
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its citizens. Concentrated wealth and concentrated power had
damaged the nation's social fabric; a system of decentralized
power, limited ownership, and small-scale capitalism could restore
it.
6 2
Bankers in general and Wall Street bankers in particular caused
the Depression; they had to be punished. Certainly bankers were
too powerful. The two extolled the virtues of small business and
small banks:
Essential to the survival of the community, therefore, was an
economy of small-scale, local enterprise. How important such an
economy was to Long and Coughlin was apparent in the frequency
with which both men lamented its disappearance. The two found
that small enterprise had been extinguished by concentrated
wealth and power. One by one, they complained, the autonomous
local institutions that sustained a meaningful community life were
vanishing in the face of distant, impersonal forces.... Local
financial institutions-what Long described as 'the little banks in
the counties and the parishes' and what Coughlin termed the
'small bankers outside the great ring of Wall Street'--were in dire
peril. So were the 'small industrialists,' who had, Coughlin
claimed, 'been bought out or ... destroyed by questionable
competition.'
65
Roosevelt had reason to coopt Long and Coughlin:
It was that possibility--that Long and Coughlin would not only
continue to gain support, but that their movements would begin
to complement each other and to merge-that politicians like
Franklin Roosevelt and James Farley found particularly alarming.
Separately, Long and Coughlin were formidable foes; together,
many feared, they might mobilize a popular following of truly
remarkable proportions.
64'
The politics of the "Second" New Deal's legislative program, begun
in 1935, was to coopt the less ugly elements of Long's and
Coughlin's program. Against that background, the next year's
Revenue Act fragmented mutual funds. When the mutual fund
provisions of the 1936 Revenue Act were discussed in committee,
Senator LaFollette argued specifically against mutual funds that
facilitated investment banker control of the public's money in the
hands of a few financiers. 
6 5
62 Id. at 144.
63 Id. at 145 (citation omitted).
64 Id. at 209.
65 1936 Revenue Act Hearings, supra note 52, pt. 11, at 36-37 (citing the PECORA
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2. The Thinking at the SEC: Douglas and
Anti-Wall Street Sentiment
William 0. Douglas, chairman of the SEC and a key player in
1930s financial legislation, including the 1940 Act, articulated a
general goal of fragmenting economic power: people who dominate
financial markets have "tremendous power." "Such [people]
become virtual governments in the power at their disposal....
[Sometimes it is] the dut[y] of government to police them, at times
to break them up, to deter their further growth."
66
Bankers should provide and direct the flow of capital, but not
control the enterprise after the capital has -flowed to it, said
Douglas. 67 His view is not just historical. In 1980, the Senate
Government Affairs Committee examined corporate ownership, and
its staff reported that "Congress [has been] concerned that the
tremendous growth in securities held ... by the larger banks,
insurance companies, pension funds, and investment advisors might
result in a concentration of economic power by a few institutional
traders.., over the managements of the companies whose stock they held
and indeed over American industiy itself."
6 8
3. Linkage to the 1936 Code and the 1940 Act
In 1935 and 1936 Roosevelt sent Congress tax proposals that
had a populist, soak-the-rich, anti-business tone. As I said,
historians believe Roosevelt wanted to coopt growing populist
forces. 69 In 1935. Long seemed likely to seek the presidency the
REPORT, supra note 7). To view the 1936 legislation as part of the coopting of Long
and Coughlin is a bit precarious. By 1936, Long was dead and Coughlin was in
decline. The reaffirmation in 1940 couldn't have directly resulted from an early
1930s political movement. And the cooption, if that's what it was, occurs on an
ideological dimension that was widespread in the United State, stretching back to the
Jeffersonians and 1890s populists and forward to today.
6 W. DOUGLAS, supra note 4, at 15. "The needs of a small Middle Western
community are apt to be better served by a banker at the head of a small local bank
than by the same banker at the head of the nation's biggest bank." Id. at 14.
67 See id. at 44-45.
6 STAFF OF SEN. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE CONCENTRATION: INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND
INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AMONG MAJOR U.S. CORPORATIONS 2 (Comm. Print
1980) (emphasis added).
69 See supra note 61 and accompanying text; A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF
ROOsEvELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 329 (1960); R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 188 (1954) ("A well-known historian, Charles Beard,.. . commented
that the [1935 tax] act served 'as a stick to beat off the storm troops of Senator Long
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next year; the 1935 proposals were said to steal his thunder,70 and
to shock both Congress and the business community.71 Roosevelt
proposed changes in the Tax Code, because, said FDR, the Tax
Code has "done little to prevent an unjust concentration of wealth
and economic power."72 'The 1936 provisions that fragmented
mutual fund portfolios should be seen in this anti-Wall Street
context.
B. Public Interest Perspectives
1. Protecting Unsophisticated Investors
Anti-Wall Street pressures were not the only reason for mutual
fund regulation; populist pressure cannot explain everything.
Surely some mutual funds wanted to regularize their industry,
making it attractive to the average saver by reducing the risks of
banker wheeling and dealing. And Congress wanted to protect
investors, fearing that unsophisticated investors would invest in
mutual funds expecting diversification but be unable to evaluate the
portfolio. The SEC testified that a mutual fund's only positive
function was to provide diversification; any extension risked
thievery.
73
Keeping mutual fund managers out of controlling positions kept
them free of conflicts of interest. The fund's investment adviser, an
investment bank, would use the control exerted by the mutual fund
to obtain securities underwriting business from the controlled
portfolio company.74 Or the investment advisor of the fund with
control would unload unwholesome securities of that controlled
company onto a gullible public.
75
Key senators wanted regulation that would eliminate mutual
fund looting at any cost, irrespective of whether the looting
and Father Coughlin.'").
70 See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 69, at 325-28. Long was assassinated in 1935.
71 See id. at 329.
72 79 CONG. REc. 9657 (1935) (message from the President, June 19, 1935)
(emphasis added); see alsoJ. WITrE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 100 (1985) (discussing Roosevelt's proposals and message to Congress).
73 See 1940 Act Hearings, supra note 10, pt. 1, at 132 (statement of George
Mathews, Member of the SEC); id. pt. 2, at 807 (statement of David Schenker, Chief
Counsel, SEC Investment Trust Study, reiterating Mathews' conclusions).
74 See PECORA REPORT, supra note 7, at 333; 1940 Act Hearings, supra note 10, pt.
1, at 36; id. at 206-07 (statement of L.M.C. Smith, Associate Counsel, Investment
Trust Study).
75 See PECORA REPORT, supra note 7, at 381-82.
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amounted to 1% or 30% of fund assets.76 (Undoubtedly, one
should not naively expect public-spirited behavior from rapacious
bankers. The difficulty in the legislative history is that it does not
equally mistrust the rapacity of corporate managers and fails to
consider whether the greed of each could be used to neutralize each
other.)
Senators also wanted to protect individual investors in mutual
funds from the machinations of insider-manipulators. Denying
financiers power to control industry was thought to reduce their
ability to manipulate the controlled business. Financiers would
control companies to issue unneeded, overpriced securities that
would be dumped into controlled mutual funds, solely to generate
fees for the financiers.
The mutual fund industry didn't strongly oppose all of the
restrictions, in fact it preferred some elements. It wanted to sell its
product and needed a code of conduct to certify the industry to the
public. 77 To make money off of the unsophisticated, the mutual
fund industry didn't need complex relations with portfolio compa-
nies; authority to use a heavy load was enough. Although resale
price maintenance has been illegal in antitrust (but attacked as not
necessarily good policy), the mutual fund industry had federally-
mandated noncompetition among dealers: the advisor sets the load,
dealers cannot cut it. Price competition among mutual fund dealers
is a criminal offense. 78 These elements can be seen as part of the
political payoff to the mutual fund industry for the operating
restrictions. And, as I note below, one type of mutual fund-the
Massachusetts trust-preferred that Congress require all mutual
funds to use a structure that the Massachusetts trust had already
adopted.
76 See id. at 333-37 (comments of Senator Wagner and others).
77 See Bosland, The Investment Company Act of 1940 and Its Background, 49 J. POL.
EcON. 687, 687 (1941). (Certification also has a cartel quality of eliminating some
rough competition.)
78 See 1940 Act § 22(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1988). See also S. REP No. 184,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS 4897, 4904
(discussing § 22(d) in the context of S. 2224, the Investment Company Amendments
Act of 1970).
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2. Promoting Political Stability
The 1940 Act and the 1936 Revenue Act remedies contrast with
the remedies in other 1930s securities legislation. The 1933 and
1934 Acts also attacked the manipulation of investors, but used
disclosure as the principal solution to roughly similar problems. To
explain the differing remedy for mutual funds, either we have to
identify a significantly different problem for remedy-e.g., investors
in mutual funds are especially unsophisticated or Blue Sky merit
regulation filled out 1933 and 1934 Act disclosure in the same way
that the 1940 Act went beyond disclosure-or identify forces other
than the public interest that were also at work.
Slaking the public's anti-Wall Street appetite would promote
political stability without compromising the central features of
capitalism. Political stability is not now in question in the United
States; in the 1930s it was. FDR himself said:
It is time to ... reverse that process of concentration of power
which has made most American citizens, once traditionally
independent owners of their own businesses, helplessly dependent
for their daily bread upon the favor of a very few, who, by devices
such as holding companies, have taken for themselves unwarranted
economic power. I am against private socialism of concentrated
economic power as thoroughly as I am against government
socialism. The one is equally as dangerous as the other; and
destruction of private socialism is utterly essential to avoid government
socialism.
79
If Roosevelt was right, then political stability in the United States-
surely a worthwhile objective-was dependent, at least in the 1930s,
on fragmenting finance. One way to fragment finance was to
eliminate investment banker control of industry through mutual
funds.
But the financial reality of the 1930s suggests that destruction
of mutual fund power to control was symbolic. Mutual funds
indeed had taken some first steps in influencing industry, and, yes,
they had the potential to be big players in finance and industry. But
the aggregate assets that mutual funds controlled in the 1930s were
just too small to be a big threat to political stability. In 1940, there
were only 68 mutual funds, with total assets of only $450 million.
8 0
79 E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 281 (1966)
(emphasis added).
Mo See W. BAUMOL, S. GoLDFELD, L. GORDON & M. KOEHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
MUTUAL FUND MARKETS: COMPETITION VERSUS REGULATION 8 (1990).
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So, it was not the immediate prospect of "unwarranted economic
power," to use Roosevelt's words, but the symbolic potential, or, at
best, the prospect that in alliance with other financial institutions,
the mutual fund would play a serious role.
A prominent historical view is that, at crucial tim'es in American
history, business interests became so powerful that a political
counterweight arises. Before big business could crush others in the
economic system, politicians saved the nation from injustice by
checking (but not destroying) those business interests. According
to this view, Andrew Jackson rose to check the crushing weight of
Eastern finance on the average American.81 Woodrow Wilson
later created the Federal Reserve System to take power away from
Morgan, who had become the nation's defacto central bank.8 2 And
then in the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt built an adminis-
trative structure as a counterweight to financial interests that were
said to have brought on the Depression.83 Certainly leading
politicians believed they were fighting for the country's soul against
a Wall Street conspiracy. Said FDR:
The real truth ... is, as you and I know, that a financial element
in the larger centers has owned the Government ever since the
days of Andrew Jackson-and I am not wholly excepting the
administration of W[oodrow] W[ilson]. The country is going
through a repetition ofJackson's fight with the Bank of the United
States-only on afar bigger and broader basis.
84
In the 1936 campaign, Roosevelt "lashed out at the economic
royalists who gathered other people's money to impose a new
industrial dictatorship."85  Roosevelt closed the campaign with a
powerful emotional speech: "[O]rganized money ... hate[s] ...
81 See A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON 88-102, 334-41 (1945).
82 See A. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1910-1917, at 43-53
(1954); R. CHERNoW, supra note 59, at 128-30.
83 See A. SCHLESINGER, THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919-1933, at 289-90
(1957); A. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 489-91 (1959). In one
historical view politicians are populists or tools of interest groups; in the other view
politicians are heroic figures saving America from powerful business interests. These
two views can be reconciled for our purposes. In the social justice vision, right-
hearted politicians save farmers and workers from the onslaught of capital. In the
other vision, cynical politicians check capital so that favored groups (labor and
managers) will be benefitted. The factual story for each historical vision is roughly
similar. The spin, the connotation, the sense of rightness, is what is variant.
84 W. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940,
at 80 (1963) (emphasis added).
85 Id. at 183-84.
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me.... I should like to have it said of my first Administration that
... [the forces of organized money] met their match.... [And] I
should like to have it said of my second Administration that in it
these forces met their master."
86
3. Fighting Cartels
One reason to block control was to block cartelization. A
mutual fund could be the means by which an investment banker
controlled several companies in a single industry, as Morgan did.
That control could be used to promote and police a cartel.
8 7
Louis Brandeis is often cited as setting the tone and providing
a plan for action.88  "The dominant element in our financial
oligarchy is the investment banker. Associated banks, trust
companies and life insurance companies are his tools."
89 Bankers
should be middlemen, raising capital only; there should be no
interlocking of financial institutions into powerful economic
centers.
9 0
Woodrow Wilson also believed small groups of people in large
corporations made autocratic decisions, concentrating in their own
hands the "resources, the choices, the opportunities, in brief, the
power of thousands." 9 1 Trusts were growing in size and power,
and had to be stopped. Brandeis prescribed the remedy: "We
must," he said, "break the [m]oney [t]rust or the [m]oney [t]rust will
break us."
92
The anti-cartel theory can be seen even today in subchapter M.
Congress liberalized the portfolio fragmentation requirements in
1942, at the behest of the mutual fund industry.93 But it was quite
86 Id. at 184.
87 See PECORA REPORT, supra note 7, at 360-63, 381; R. CHERNOW, supra note 59,
at 66-68.
8 See V. CAROSsO, THE MORGANS-PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL BANKERS 1854-1913,
at 639-40 (1987); F. PEcORA, supra note 60, at 39 (noting favorable Senatorial
thoughts about L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE
IT (1914), during the Pecora hearings).
89 L. BRANDEIS, supra note 88, at 4.
90 See id. at 6-9, 47-50.
91 W. Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community, 192 N. AM. REv. 604, 612 (1910); see
also W. DIAMOND, THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF WOODROW WILSON 67 (1943)
(presenting Wilson's argument that financiers control railroads and industry to the
detriment of the nation).
92 L. BRANDEIS, supra note 88, at 201.
93 See Revenue Act of 1942 § 170(a), Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798, 878
(codified at I.R.C. § 851(b)(4)(B) (1988)).
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careful to stymie mutual fund control of industry. No more than
25% of the mutual fund's portfolio could go into the stock of a
single company. Nor could 25% go into the stock of two or more
controlled companies "engaged in the same or similar trades or
businesses or related trades or businesses." 94 The fund could put
all of its assets into a single industry and get pass-through tax status
and diversified status under the 1940 Act. But it could not control
companies in that single industry. And owning 20% of the stock of
a portfolio company gave the mutual fund control for purposes of
the fragmentation requirement. The legislative history shows an
example:
Investment company W... has its assets invested as follows: 20
percent in cash and Government securities, 5 percent in corpora-
tion A, 10 percent in corporation B, 25 percent in corporation C,
and the other 40 percent in the securities of miscellaneous
corporations, not exceeding 5 percent in any one issuer. Invest-
ment company W owns more than 20 percent of the voting power
of corporations B and C. Corporation B manufactures radios and
corporation C acts as its distributor and also distributes radios for
other companies. Investment company W fails to meet the
requirements of section 361(b)(4) since it has 35 percent of its
assets invested in the securities of two issuers which it controls and
which are engaged in related trades or businesses.
95
If monitoring by mutual funds were functionally possible, this tax
rule would be a barrier. Monitoring requires specialized staff, with
industry knowledge. If the fund cannot concentrate its influential
blocks in a single industry, or its vertically related parts, assembling
a staff would be difficult or impossible.
The post-1942 structure of subchapter M produces odd results.
If the mutual fund keeps its entire portfolio fragmented, it can put
its entire portfolio into a single industry. A few mutual funds do
this-Fidelity's "Select" funds come to mind. Shareholders of these
funds get little diversification. Because the fund managers are
exclusively investing in a single industry, they might acquire enough
expertise so that they can second-guess some portfolio company
managers every now and then. Functionally, the fund might get
enough expertise to feel comfortable with a few influential posi-
tions. After all, the shareholders are not getting much diversifica-
9 4 
Id.
95 HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE REVENUE BILL OF 1942, H.R. REP.
No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1942).
1494 UNI-VERSITYOFPEiVSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 139:1469
tion from the fund anyway: its portfolio is all in one industry. But
the fund managers cannot put more than 25% of its assets into
control blocks in a single industry; the fund cannot concentrate
investments in a single industry without tax penalty.
C. Interest Groups
1. The Managers: But Dimly
From a modern perspective, one would have expected managers
to have been ardent supporters of the fragmentation of mutual
funds. Corporate managers want independence from their share-
holders. Certainly one can readily find managerial support for anti-
takeover legislation,96 and managers benefitted from financial
fragmentation. But the evidence does not show direct, powerful
lobbying, or even testifying by managers in 1936 or 1940. Perhaps
managers did not exert their influence because in the 1930s mutual
funds were small players in the financial world, and the political
action then was mostly symbolic.
But that does not mean we should dismiss the managerial public
choice story completely. At least some politicians who promoted
the 1940 Act appealed to managerial freedom from Wall Street
control, and there is evidence that the 1936 and 1940 Act fragmen-
tation provisions had survival strength because they did not threaten
managers.
William 0. Douglas, as commissioner and chairman of the SEC
in the 1930s, had a pivotal role in the regulation of financial
institutions. Undoubtedly, he reflected the concepts and prejudices
of many during that crucial. time. While he was a commissioner, the
SEC proposed the Investment Company Act and formulated rules
limiting joint action.
Douglas's statements show two relevant principles: a displeasure
with Wall Street, which roughly corresponds to our populist
principle, and a displeasure with bankers controlling managers,
which roughly corresponds to our managerial interest group story.
Douglas surely wanted to destroy Wall Street control of Main Street,
as he said in a 1937 speech, which I quoted in the introduction and
repeat here:
9 See Romano, supra note 57, at 121-22, 138-41; Ryngaert & Netter, Shareholder
Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 373, 375-76
(1988); Wayne, Pennsylvania Lends Force to Anti.Takeover Trend, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19,
1990, at Al, col. 3 ("Pennsylvania business groups support[] the bill .... ").
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[T]he banker will ... [be] ... restricted to ... underwriting or
selling. Insofar as management [and] formulation of industrial
policies ... it is my belief that the banker will be superseded. The
financial power which he has exercised in the past over such
processes will pass into other hands.
97
"Remote control by an inside few of these fundamental economic
and human matters is fatal. There can be in our form of corporate
and industrial organization no royalism which can long dictate or
control these basic matters,"9 8 he said. The power of Wall Street
must be held at bay: "finance moves into the zone of exploitation
whenever it becomes the master rather than the faithful and loyal
servant of investors and business. To make finance such a servant
rather than a master becomes a central plank in any platform for
reform."
99
Members of Congress echoed this theme. Floor debates during
the securities legislation of the 1930s show the House of Represen-
tatives applauding calls to limit the power of bankers.
[T]he failure of many of our great industrial corporations is due
to investment-banker management.... [B]anker directors living
remote from the properties operated have no understanding of the
... industry they direct.... The deplorable situation of many of
our great industrial corporations is directly due to their banker
management.... Congress must make it unlawful for any person
to act as a director... who shall also be [an investment banking]
parter .... 100
2. Survivorship
Even if managers were not crucial to passage of the fragmenta-
tion rule in 1936 (and again in 1940), one can still see a managerial
interest group picture, although only a dimly lit one. If the rule had
seriously impinged on managerial authority, managers would have
objected. And the evidence I'll discuss below suggests that the
97 W. DOUGLAS, supra note 4, at 40-41 (emphasis added). As I noted previously,
supra note 4, this speech was made in 1937 before a shocked group of Wall Street
investment bankers.
9
8Id. at 10.
99 Id. at 44; cf. McCraw, The Public and Private Spheres in Historical Perspective, in
PUBLiC-PRrvATE PARTNERSHip 31, 51-52 (H. Brooks, L. Liebman & C. Schelling eds.
1984) (noting that "[instead of wreaking vengeance [for a discredited securities
market] the [SEC] set out to restore legitimacy to Wall Street's essential function of
channeling investment capital into enterprise").
00 77 CONG. REc. 2933-34 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Marland).
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corporate managers might have killed the rule. Even at the height
of the New Deal, if a rule threatened managers it would have been
unstable, subsequently challenged, and then probably reversed.
Consider the experience of two tax rules passed in 1936. One
threatened managers, the other-mutual fund fragmentation-did
not. The threatening provisions were attacked, watered down, and
then repealed. The non-threatening, manager-friendly portfolio
fragmentation rules have persisted nearly intact for fifty years;
they've been watered down only once, in 1942, and then only
slightly.
The 1936 Revenue Act taxed undistributed corporate profits.
If a corporation retained 60% or more of its net income, the
retained earnings were taxed at a rate of 27%.101 The tax, not
surprisingly, pushed managers to distribute most of their profits.
Companies that needed funds were dependent on capital markets
to replenish the monies dividended out. When they returned to the
capital markets, bankers and securities buyers would scrutinize the
managers' results, and penalize them (in the form of higher capital
costs) if the results were poor.
Companies with diminished prospects for future profit would
face difficulty in raising new funds. One suspects that during the
Depression many companies met the economic requisites for
contraction; once they dividended out their funds, they would be
forced to contract. Managers unhappily found themselves control-
ling a smaller enterprise.
Either way managers were unhappy with a serious tax on
retained earnings. If they needed new funds for expansion, they
disliked the increased scrutiny of bankers and other investors. If
their company were one that should have been contracting,
managers disliked the quickened pace of contraction induced by a
retained earnings tax, which forced fast and heavy dividends when
the capital markets would not provide new funds.
101 See Revenae Act of 1936 § 14(b), Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648, 1656
(repealed 1939). The tax was graduated:
Percentage of net Tax on the
income not distributed undistributed income
10% or less 7%
10 to 20% 12%
20 to 40% 17%
40 to 60% 22%
60% or more 27%
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While this view of capital markets and managers has a modern
ring,10 2 it was intuitively well-understood during the 1930s. A
representative of management said during the 1936 hearings that
the undistributed profits tax would cause conflict "between those
engaged in the management of a business and those who are purely
investors."1 03 Berle and Means recognized and advocated finding
ways to subject managers to the capital markets:
Only one general protection beside the power of active revolt
remains to guarantee a measure of equitable treatment to the
several classes of security holders. The enterprise may need new
capital. The management must, therefore, maintain a situation in
which additional capital is forthcoming.... This need for new
capital sets a very definite limit on the extent to which those in
control can abuse the suppliers of capital.... How adequate a
protection this is, however, depends on factors that are wholly
beyond the investor's control: the state of the industry, the
position of the particular corporation, and the attitude of the
management.
10 4
And one might add to Berle and Means's list, the extent to which an
undistributed profits tax forces distribution, subjecting managers to
the capital markets.
Tugwell, the Administration's principal proponent of an
accumulated earnings tax, and at times an academic and administra-
tive colleague of Berle, offered managerial discipline as a rationale
for the undistributed profits tax. His principal goal was to reduce
excessive corporate savings, which he thought would increase
consumer spending. But he and others in the Administration
thought the tax "would give the stockholders more influence in the
formulation of corporation dividend and corporation saving
policies."
1 05
1
0 2 See Easterbrook, Two ExplanationsforDividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650 (1984);
Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Law Settings, 92 YALE L.J.
49 (1982).
10
3 Revenue Act of 1936: Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 514, 520 (1936) (statement of Herman H. Lind, General
Manager, National Machine-Tool Builders Ass'n).
104 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 3, at 280-81.
105 S. RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 474 (1967); see also
D. FUSFELD, THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE NEW DEAL 211-12 (1956) (discussing Tugwell's plan for an undistributed
profits tax which would lead to higher output and greater productivity from private
business); A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 69, at 506-07 (describing Tugwell's plan as an
attempt "to force corporate profits into purchasing power as wages or dividends").
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Managers and their political allies vehemently objected to this
undistributed profits tax.106 "Few taxes have evoked such a storm
of passionate and partisan controversy as that on the undistributed
profits tax. Spokesmen for corporations objected strenuously on
the ground that the tax made for economic instability, [and]
interfered with corporate policies .... "107 In 1938, the Chamber
of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the
American Mining Congress, and the New York Board of Trade all
opposed the taxi °8 They succeeded: first they got Congress to
cut the rate.10 9 The next year they got Congress to repeal the
tax.110 Managers' decisions on how much of the profits to pay
out to shareholders would no longer be affected by the corporate
tax. Managers could retain earnings, and were more free from the
discipline of the capital markets.
The survivorship argument should now be clear. Proposals can
originate in the Treasury Department without any interest group
pressure. The Treasury may well make its proposals based solely on
what Treasury officials think would be best for the country, based
on their own policy predilections. But for a proposal to survive it
must not gore the ox of a powerful interest group. The tax on
undistributed profits threatened managers; within a few years they
killed it. In contrast, the Treasury's simultaneous proposal to tax
mutual funds with only fragmented portfolios did not incur the ire
of managers; it survived.
To be sure, this story does not make managers the moving force
behind the mutual fund tax bill, as they often are in modern anti-
takeover legislation. But it suggests that managers could well have
killed mutual fund fragmentation if they felt threatened. They did
nothing about mutual fund fragmentation either because they liked
1
06 See R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 410, 411 (1940) (citing
hearings).
107 S. RATNER, supra note 105, at 474; see R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, supra note 106,
at 411 (citing 80 CONG. REC. 6317 (1936)); Enright, Business Opposes Tax on Surpluses,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1936, at 9, col. 4.
108 See Revenue Revision, 1939: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 102, 104 (1939) (testimony of E. Alvord of Chamber of
Commerce); id. at 145, 150-51 (testimony of Noel Sargent, Secretary of National
Association of Manufacturers); id. at 133, 135 (testimony of Julian D. Conover of
American Mining Congress); id. at 174, 177 (testimony of M. L. Seidman of the
taxation committee of the N.Y. Board of Trade).
109 See Revenue Act of 1938 § 13(c), Pub. L. No. 75-554, 52 Stat. 447, 455.
110 See Revenue Act of 1939 § 201, Pub. L. No. 76-155, 53 Stat. 862, 864 (deleting
undistributed profits tax from I.R.C.).
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it, or because they were indifferent to it. Since mutual funds were
small players in the 1930s, managers may have cared little about the
structure of mutual fund portfolios back then.
3. Massachusetts Trusts
Massachusetts trusts typically had a diversified structure.1 1
The trustees avoided controlling industry. When the 1936 Tax Act
was considered and passed, one of the key players was Senator
Walsh, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, from Massachusetts.
He praised the Massachusetts trusts' structure and advocated
mandating that all mutual funds have their structure. The 1936 Tax
Code portfolio requirements essentially did that. Massachusetts
trusts lobbied for the 1936 legislation with portfolio requirements
roughly mimicking their own portfolio policies. 112 Massachusetts
trusts could comply without a change in operation; others would
have to bend. I believe a large number of mutual funds still operate
out of Massachusetts.
IV. POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
I am seeking a political story to partly explain the fragmented
ownership of the large public corporation in the United States.
Politics produced financial fragmentation and financial fragmenta-
tion partly produced the large public corporation. The critical
political elements are Federalism, interest groups and popular
ideology, leavened by the public interest. Populism tended to
weaken financial institutions. While populism could not itself
weaken all of them, when there were plausible public-regarding
benefits to fragmentation, or when an important interest group
favored fragmentation, the result has usually been to fragment
finance. Elsewhere I've claimed that these elements induced
fragmentation of American finance, fostering the fragmented
ownership of the public company l1 3 Here I claim that popular
ideology and some public-interest views, leavened by some luke-
warm interest group action, fragmented mutual funds.
But perhaps there is an overriding economic story, conceivably
an efficiency one, to explain the political story. Why have Germany
Ill See D. ROBINSON, MASSACHUSE'UrS INVESTORS TRUST: PIONEER IN OPEN-END
INVESTMENT TRUSTS 14 (1954).
112 See id. at 16, 19-20.
113 See Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 5, at 31-32.
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and Japan had much more powerful financial institutions that can
heavily influence and indeed sometimes control industry? Several
hypotheses are possible. The accidents of history may have led
different systems to evolve in different countries. Perhaps the
Japanese and German systems are inefficient, or just different but
no better and no worse. Perhaps they lag an advanced American
financial system, although -we must wonder why they have caught up
or surpassed us in industry but lag in finance. Or perhaps countries
with a feudal past and a recent acquisition of democracy more
willingly tolerate the hierarchical implications of industry influence
and control by financial institutions. To the extent this is so, then
we should now expect to see political pressure in Germany and
Japan to reduce the power of their financial institutions.
114
But there is another possibility, a "meta" economic explanation
for the political result: perhaps American and Japanese political
and financial institutions responded to the underlying economics in
each nation. Could the relative scarcity of managerial talent and
capital explain the varying institutional arrangements?
Capital and resources have been relatively abundant in America,
while skilled labor, perhaps including skilled managers, have been
relatively scarce. Post-World War II Japan lacked capital and
resources, but had a relative abundance of skilled and disciplined
managers and workers. Did the relatively scarce resource in the
United States-managerial talent-lead to contracts that favored
managers at the expense of the abundant resource-capital? Those
favorable contracts could include managerial autonomy from
capital. These contracts were written, this story would go, but
written in the political environment. In Japan and Germany, with
capital scarce, the arrangements would favor capital.
This economic "meta".-story could help explain why contracts
favoring managers would arise in the United States more than in
Germany or Japan. But it wouldn't explain why these contracts
would be written by Congress, instead of privately by each company
and its managers. Here is one possibility: political pressure always
arises to fragment finance, but politicians in an environment where
capital is relatively more scarce resist this legislation. Why? Some
politicians are reluctant because of the public interest; those
managers who want autonomy may not seek the legislation vocifer-
ously, since with capital scarce other forms of private financial
114 Id. at 65 n.206.
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control will emerge anyway; institutions with capital resist the
restrictions more strongly than they otherwise would. When capital
is plentiful, the forces of fragmenting don't face these impediments.
What prediction would we make if capital became relatively
more scarce in America and less scarce in Germany and Japan, a
reversal occurring during the last decade? We should expect
pressure, both financial and politica4 in Germany and Japan to
change the relationships between capital and managers. Japanese
and German managers would become more free from capital; and
American financial institutions would develop more muscle. The
first seems to be happening; the second possibility is generating
talk.
115
V. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS
My main purpose here has been to understand how politics and
the 1930s conception of the proper role of mutual funds led to
regulation and taxation that prohibited mutual funds from becom-
ing important players in corporate governance. But this story has
potential prescriptive implications. The SEC is now reviewing
whether it should seek amendment to the 1940 Act.116 The SEC
should consider corporate governance as well as investor protection
as it rethinks mutual fund regulation.
Because I am dubious about the monitoring or informational
potential of more powerful financial institutions,117 I am uncer-
tain about what prescriptions are in order. True, Japan and
Germany have had different relationships between financial
institutions and industrial companies, and have not been irredeem-
ably hobbled by these differences. But we cannot yet tell whether
the German and Japanese arrangements were inefficient (although
115 At least one major discordant note sounds in this story. Many restrictions on
capital arose in the United States in the 1930s, when capital was relatively scarce.
Generalizations cannot explain everything.
116 Se4 e.g., Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation of Investment
Companies, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,607 (June 15,1990)
(requesting recommendations on whether the 1940 Act should be revised "[i]n light
of the recent significant changes in the securities markets").
117 See Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 5, at 53-65. The monitoring story is the
central one in the literature today. But I wonder whether the weak link is in the
securities markets. Fragmented investors might not process firm-specific information
well, because it's too expensive, technical, or proprietary. If this is so-it is-and
important, then large block holders could help produce better run firms not by
monitoring, but by understanding.
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they couldn't have been debilitatingly so) or efficient only in the
context of German and Japanese history, culture, and ability to
systematically produce good regulation and good regulators.
In Germany investment companies play an important role in
corporate governance. Banks aggregate the vote of stock they own
directly, stock owned by investment companies that the bank
controls, and stock owned. by individuals but deposited with the
bank as custodian.118  They aggregate these votes-frequently
amounting to 40% of the vote in many companies-to elect directors
of portfolio companies, directors not beholden to the portfolio
companies' managers. This activity would be barred in the United
States by the Glass-Steagall Act, and would face serious, probably
prohibitive obstacles under the 1940 Act because of the likelihood
of conflicts of interest. How and whether this conflict is avoided in
Germany is unclear.
A common misconception about German and Japanese banks is
that their influence in industry comes only from control of credit.
In Germany control over credit is a secondary factor; in Japan
control over credit (which is weakening as a securities market for
debt arises) may have been primary; but banks there control large
blocks of stock as well. This misconception is understandable.
Americans are so inured to banks being separated from commerce
that credit intuitively seems to be the means of bank influence. But
German banks enter the boardroom not through the usual advan-
tage of a bank-control over credit-but through control of the proxy
machinery.
Even if we thought that greater involvement of financial
institutions would be salutary, we should be cautious. Financial
institutions would not generally be better informed than incumbent
managers who have spent a lifetime in their businesses; financiers
could not- systematically manage companies any better. At best,
financiers will be less biased toward growth, their representatives on
corporate boards would be more likely to be independent of
managers and would have the incentive to make the board a good
one. At worst, they will be affected by their own conflicts of
interest-seeking deal-making for fees-and never contribute to the
functioning of the enterprise.
In the governance of small firms financiers play important roles,
despite that the entrepreneur is better informed about the business.
118 See Gottschalk, Der Stirmrechtseinfluss derBanken in den Aktiondrsvernammlungen
von Grossunternehmenw WSI-MrrrEILUNGEN, May 1988, at 294.
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The financier there-called then a venture capitalist-appears to be
functional. Such financiers know enough to avoid managing the
enterprise, to only'ask questions and put operating managers on a
budget. Yet financiers disappear from the boardroom when the
enterprise goes public. Perhaps financiers usually disappear from
the boardroom because their involvement would be dysfunctional.
But although they cannot always be dysfunctional, it is nearly always
so that their involvement is-legally restricted, as is the involvement
of a mutual fund or its investment advisor.
If we were sure that financial institutions could improve
operating companies, then we should examine the following
question: should the fragmentation rules in the 1940 Act and the
Tax Code be dropped? The diversification rule in the 1940 Act
could be solely a disclosure matter, which could tie into modern
notions of diversification; a fund that owned more than 10% of the
portfolio company's stock could still be diversified. The large block
limits and industry limits in subchapter M could be dropped. In the
modern securities market, the central protection to buyers of the
fund is adequate disclosure about the structure of the fund's
portfolio.
The basic concept of diversification in the two acts is well-
meaning but antiquated. The laws' notion of diversification-no
more than 5% of a single issuer-offers little in the way of investor
,protection. As I've shown, a mutual fund could put all of its monies
into a single industry, making the fund ridiculously undiversified.
True, the restrictions on 10%+ blocks might really be responses to
liquidity, not diversification problems. But these could also be
accommodated. Disclosure of illiquidity problems might be
possible. Permission to slow-down redemptions in some circum-
stances might be possible. Dividends by pro-rata distribution of
stock position might be considered.
Conflicts of interest cannot be ignored. But mutual funds
present relatively low risks of conflicts since they have little to offer
the industrial firm. Mutual funds are not like banks and insurance
companies, with loan officers searching for high-interest loans.
True, some mutual funds (or, more accurately, their advisors) want
access to inside information, others have pension plans to peddle,
and others are affiliated with investment banks that could have
something to sell. If these seem serious risks, deregulation could
begin only with fully independent funds.
If prevention of conflicts of interest were the only goal, then
continuation of the fragmentation rules would have some rationale.
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But while conflicts of interest should not be ignored, they should
not be the only factor weighed in the balance. Recent trends in
corporate governance suggest that American companies could profit
from more, not less, outside oversight, and mutual funds could be
a good place to start. Unlike banks, mutual funds are not highly
leveraged.11 9 A decline in value at a large undiversified mutual
fund does not have the same risks as a decline in value of a highly
leveraged bank. The decline in value at the mutual fund is absorbed
by thousands of unlucky individuals; the absorption is smooth, the
transaction costs low. The decline in value at a highly leveraged
bank is absorbed by bank stockholders and the government
insurance fund; the absorption of losses is bumpy, transaction costs
are high, the moral hazard of excess risk-taking by insolvent banks
is substantial. Failure of a money market mutual fund might have
consequences similar to the failure of a bank; these consequences
justify stringent safety regulation of money market funds. Such
considerations don't spillover to justify prohibiting a "large block"
fund whose riskiness has been well disclosed.
Would the current mutual fund industry want to be associated
in investors' minds with such "large block" funds? The mutual fund
industry itself would be wary of "large block" funds for two reasons,
one illegitimate and one legitimate. Since the funds cannot as a
matter of law functionally monitor industry, mutual fund managers
have no reason to develop the requisite skills. Lacking those skills,
fund managers would oppose allowing competition in a dimension
in which most are unsuited. This is a standard kind of interest
group pressure from incumbents. While real and probably
determinative of the outcome, it is illegitimate.
A closely related consideration is, however, legitimate. Investors
who see a risky "large block" fund fail may flee all mutual funds as
vehicles for their savings. This flight would be unfortunate.
Investor protection would demand heavy disclosure of the risks of
concentrated blocks, so that unsophisticated individuals aren't
bilked. Any deregulation should categorize "large block" funds as
a vehicle quite different than the current mutual funds. That way,
the inevitable failure of some "large block" funds will not spillover
to the rest of the industry. Distinguishing the two types of funds,
making the "large block" funds a separate industry, would require
at a minimum that they have a catchy name that is clearly distinct
119 See 1940 Act § 18(a)(1), (f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a)(1), (f)(1) (1988).
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from mutual funds. Unfortunately, I do not have that catchy name
yet.
We should keep in mind that within its purposes-diversification
and professional management-the current rules work well. Any
deregulation should leave the current industry alone, regulated as
it is now. A parallel industry of collective investments could arise
with a different set of regulations, similar to proposals for banking
to allow an ultra-safe, federally-insured narrow bank while a
connected, less-regulated, uninsured bank bore risks and undertook
activities not now permitted banks.
Of greater weight in the deregulation balance is the risk that it
would harm the very matter that interests us: oversight of manag-
ers. There's evidence that institutional ownership sometimes
enhances managerial power.1 20 As I've said, financial institutions
want to sell their products. Insurance companies and banks want
to sell loans, for example. Mutual fund complexes cannot sell loans,
but they are not without anything to sell. They would like to
manage pension plans. In the recent battle over anti-takeover
legislation in Pennsylvania, some mutual funds opposed the
legislation. Allegations were heard that one fund dropped its
opposition to the anti-takeover bill when managers at a large
Pennsylvania corporation switched administration of the company's
pension plan to the mutual fund.
12 1
If these risks seem large enough, deregulation could be coupled
to a back-scratching prohibition: no 5%+ ownership if the fund, or
an affiliated group, sells pension services to the 5%+ company.
Furthermore, we may have a bump on a continuum. A sizable, but
uninfluential block in the hands of someone with something to sell
enhances managerial power. But at some point, the block becomes
so large that power shifts to the institution, and it becomes
relatively more interested in making money by making the company
well-run rather than by selling a few dollars of services to the
company.
Moreover, the shareholder of a mutual fund has more power to
deal with conflicts of interest of mutual fund managers than she does
to deal with conflicts of interest of corporate managers. To sever her
ties with conflicted and underperforming corporate managers, the
shareholder must overcome severe collective action problems. She
120 See Bricklcy, Lease & Smith, Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover
Amendments, 20J. FIN. ECON. 267 (1988).
121 See Crovitz, Keystone State Kapitalism, Barron's, Apr. 23, 1990, at 10, col. 1.
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must mount a takeover or proxy contest to get rid of the offending
managers. True, she can sell her shares to someone else. But that
someone else is inextricably bound to the offending managers,
unless he can overcome the collective actions problems. Since he
will be bound, he will only pay her for the value of the package: a
pro-rata interest in the underperforming firm afflicted with these
managers. In contrast, the owner of the typical open-end fund may
redeem her shares. She can send the shares into the company, and
get her money back from the company. The offending managers
could quickly find themselves with no assets to manage. Redemp-
tion is a serious risk for sub-par mutual fund managers.
Lifting fragmentation rules for nonconflicted mutual funds is
the easy advice. The difficult questions arise from the rules that
prohibit joint action with other financial institutions. Joint action
is where the largest gains and the largest risks lie. Even today, the
largest equity mutual fund has no more than $15 billion in as-
sets. 122 (Groups of mutual funds have larger aggregate assets.)
That's a lot on some absolute scale, but not so much that lots of
industry monitoring can occur from a mutual fund acting alone.
After all, most investors want diversification from mutual funds,
even if the funds can provide monitoring services. Because of this
investor demand for diversification, only some mutual fund assets
will be switched into monitoring. Additional assets may flow into
monitoring mutual funds from other savings vehicles, if funds can
enhance returns by improving corporate governance. But it is the
largest of the public corporations, the Fortune 200 companies, say,
or those that cannot readily have a substitute monitor-a rich
individual, or the takeover market for example-that are the firms
most likely to benefit from enhanced monitoring. But these firms
are the most difficult for even the largest mutual funds to monitor,
since the funds cannot acquire a large enough block to have
influence. A group of financial institutions might be needed. That
is, savings can be found in mutual funds, banks, insurance compa-
nies, and pension funds. Each savings vehicle has a separate savings
function; linking a few multi-billion dollar blocks together could
enable financial institutions to enter the boardrooms of the largest
industrial companies, as do financial institutions in other nations.
Compensating the mutual fund advisor is a problem. If the
advisor monitors or enters the portfolio company's boardroom, it
122 See STANDARD & POOR'S/LIPPER, MUTUAL FUND PRoFILES, 103 (May 1991).
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will incur expenses, which it would ordinarily pass onto the mutual
fund shareholders. If these expenses are more than trivial, the
mutual fund's shareholders have an inducement to withdraw from
the fund and invest their money in parallel investments, free-riding
on the mutual fund shareholders that remain and bear all of the
expenses. It is rational for the mutual fund shareholders to
withdraw even if the expenses produce greater gains in the value of
the portfolio stock. Withdrawal would allow the stockholder to get
the gains without incurring the expense.
But if the mutual fund could take big blocks and act easily with
a block owned by an affiliated institution, then the affiliated
institution might bear some of the expense (but only to the extent
it benefits the institution's directly-owned block).123 The mutual
fund stock would be there just to give the affiliated institution
enough voting power to get into the boardroom. But this relation-
ship is exactly the kind that risks serious conflicts of interest;
deductively it is unclear whether the gains outweigh the losses.
I can sketch a few of the general problems here. First, we just
do not know how substantial the gains would be from institutional
entry into the boardroom.1 2 4 Without a rough estimate, it's hard
to know how much risk we should run of conflicts of interest or of
concentration of economic power. Second, as I said, the big
governance gains are not going to come from unleashing mutual
funds alone, but from networking of several institutions. But these
linkages create the greatest risks of the very thing that fragmenta-
tion was designed to prevent: concentrations of economic power
and conflicts of interest. The bank linked with the mutual fund,
may take control not for enhancing industrial governance, but to
make sure it can place high-priced loans with the portfolio compa-
ny. Value is thereby transferred from the mutual fund and its
shareholders to the bank and its shareholders.
Nevertheless, the balance between governance gains and
concentration losses probably should be shifted a bit. What we
cannot say is how much it should be shifted. Conflicts can be
minimized by allowing networking only if the other institutions in
the network also forsake selling their products to the portfolio
company.
123 See R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 76-78 (1982).
124 For a brief discussion of the limits and costs of institutional monitoring, see
Roe, A Political Theoy, supra note 5, at 54-59.
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The focal point for readjusting the balance between conflicts,
concentrated power, and governance would be the prohibition on
joint activity with nonconflicted affiliates. Possibly, some of these
prohibitions could be partially lifted. That is, today the 1940 Act
prohibits, absent SEC exemption, a mutual fund owning 5%+ of a
portfolio company from acting jointly-to go onto the portfolio
company's board, for example-with its investment advisor or any
entity that owns 5%+ of the same portfolio company.125  This
prohibition could be diluted for affiliates that are insurance
companies, other mutual funds, bank trust departments, and
pension funds, as long as the other financial entities do not sell
their products to the portfolio company.1
26
Such rules would not be perfect. If the downside can be
alleviated by reducing the prospect of conflicts of interest, then the
question is how much upside there will be. For this I cannot be
tremendously optimistic. True, mutual funds (and other institution-
al investors) seem recently to be more carefully attending to
shareholder voting than they once were. This improvement in
small-scale monitoring is a reason for optimism. But mutual funds
could continue to be oriented to short-run price performance,
because that is the way fund managers get ahead, or because fund
managers must heed the short-run orientation of the individuals
who buy shares of mutual funds. Even if law and politics helped
induce the separation of Wall Street from Main Street, reversing law
may not easily undo the separation. Corporate culture and history
cannot be so easily reversed.
And the potential gains from monitoring cannot be enormous.
A mutual fund could be organized that took only influential blocks.
It would be taxed at rates of 6.8% and 10.2% on its dividends and
34% on its capital gains, when realized. It would be regulated as a
1940 Act company.127 It would have to put up with other securi-
125 See 1940 Act § 17(a), (d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a), (d) (1988); 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.17d-1 (1990); Kroll, The "Portfolio Affiliate* Problem, 3 ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG.
261 (R. Mundheim & A. Fleischer, Jr. eds. 1972); Rosenblat & Lybecker, Some
Thoughts on the Federal Securities Laws Regulating External Investment Management
Arrangements and the ALI Federal Securities Code Project 124 U. PA. L. REv. 587, 651-54
(1976); Comment, The Application of Section 17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940
to Portfolio Affiliates, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1972).
126 Rule 17a-6 exempts some joint efforts, but not the interesting ones. See 17
C.F.R. § 270.17a-6 (1990). Rule 17d-1 restricts most interesting joint efforts. If
applicable in Germany, it would prohibit many of the alliances that empower bankers
to enter the corporate boardrooms. See id. at § 270.17d-1.
127 When a company has 40% of its assets in investment securities, it becomes a
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ties regulations that kick in for large blockholders. If we estimate
the average tax cost as 10% or 15%, and the "tax" from 1940 Act
restrictions as another 5% or 10%, and the "tax" from other
securities restrictions as another 5%, then total costs come to 25%,
more or less. This cost is not impossible to overcome. Since we
don't see such funds, we must believe that such funds could not
improve corporate operations by more than 25%. Two alternatives
could explain the modest potential gains. (1) Funds with control
simply could do little good in any state of the world. The difference
between the American securities-market-centered finance and other
nations' financial-institution-centered finance is one of form and not
of performance. Or, (2) substitute forms of monitoring-such as
that from rich individuals, the takeover market, the capital market,
and product market competition-reduce the advantages of outsider
monitoring to 25% or less.
Whether such deregulation is politically possible is another
question. Perhaps managers cannot succeed in defeating what
seems to be public-regarding legislation. Perhaps mutual funds in
the boardroom could not arouse public passions in the same way
that takeovers can. The SEC's position could make a difference. If
the SEC proposes to loosen up the constraints on mutual funds in
the 1990s, as opposed to tightening them up as the SEC advocated
in the 1930s, the political balance, and the perception of where the
public interest lies, could tip in favor of allowing larger mutual fund
blocks.
CONCLUSION
Just when Berle and Means were announcing the emergence of
the public corporation with uncontrolled managers at the helm,
Congress raised the cost or made impossible mutual fund influence
of industry. The restrictions in the 1936 Tax Code and the 1940
Act make it impossible to deploy a majority of the fund's portfolio
in influential blocks. The 1940 Act raises the cost of influence even
with the unregulated portion of the portfolio by regulating or
prohibiting activities with affiliates.
presumptive investment company. See 1940 Act § 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C § 80a-3(a)(3)
(1988). If through majority-owned subsidiaries, the company were engagedprimarily
in its subsidiaries' business, then it gets an exemption from the 1940 Act. This is
essentially saying that if the portfolio companies are subsidiaries, and the investment
company is a holding company parent, the 1940 Act doesn't bite.
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Elements of a "traditional" public choice story-of interest
groups buying favorable legislation-are present. But surprisingly
the interest group story does not drive the legislation. The ideology
of fragmentation seems paramount. Key actors-FDR, Douglas,
Brandeis, and Wilson-thought that Wall Street control of industry
was bad. The interest group story, if there is one, comes from the
appeals some of them made, favoring managers over bankers, and
from the persistent survival of the fragmenting legislation.
Congress simultaneously passed the fragmenting tax legislation and
an undistributed profits tax, which threatened managerial indepen-
dence. The threatening tax -was unstable, challenged, and eventually
repealed.
Rather than an interest group story, we should think of the
politics of mutual funds in the 1930s as creating mutual funds.
Without tax exemption, the funds could not survive. Politicians
allowed tax exemption consistent with their conception of what a
mutual fund should be and should not be. It should not control
industry; it should not have concentrated investments; it should not
be entangled in financial alliances that could create conflicts of
interest. Politicians created a framework for mutual funds to grow,
a framework that made it difficult or impossible for mutual funds
to actively affect portfolio companies.
Undoubtedly investors want many things: diversification, low
risk, high return, instant liquidity, easy evaluation of the investment,
no risk of conflict of interests in any intermediary, and perfectly-
managed industrial companies. Obviously, some goals must be
traded off against others. The 1940 Act and subchapter M make it
easy to diversify and get high liquidity. They minimize the conflicts
of interest between the fund advisor and fund owners. But they
don't easily allow investors to buy an intermediary that takes big
stock positions and forms coalitions with other financial institutions
to sit on the boards of portfolio companies. These laws reduce the
agency costs in the intermediary, but are unhelpful in reducing the
agency costs in the portfolio company, or in integrating industry
with capital, by facilitating the flow of soft and proprietary informa-
tion from the industrial company to capital intermediaries that take
large stock positions and sit on the boards of portfolio companies.
Perhaps that is the right trade-off to make. But it isn't obvious that
it is the only plausible way to trade-off goals; it is not the trade-off
made in other countries.
The fragmented ownership structure of the large public
corporation is often thought to be a natural economic evolution.
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Perhaps it is. But it is hard to be sure when politics raises the cost
of, or prohibits, powerful financial institutions from entering the
boardrooms of industry and, for better or worse, from influencing
management of the largest companies. Financial institutions
controlling large blocks of stock are rarely found in the boardrooms
of the largest companies; the fragmentation of mutual funds is one
reason why.

